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 Abstract :  The European Convention on Human Rights is rapidly evolving into a 
cosmopolitan legal order: a transnational legal system in which all public ofﬁ cials 
bear the obligation to fulﬁ ll the fundamental rights of every person within their 
jurisdiction. The emergence of the system depended on certain deep, structural 
transformations of law and politics in Europe, including the consolidation of a 
zone of peace and economic interdependence, of constitutional pluralism at the 
national level, and of rights cosmopolitanism at the transnational level. Framed by 
Kantian ideas, the paper develops a theoretical account of a cosmopolitan legal 
system, provides an overview of how the ECHR system operates, and establishes 
criteria for its normative assessment. 
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 A cosmopolitan legal order [CLO] is a transnational legal system in which 
all public ofﬁ cials bear the obligation to fulﬁ ll the fundamental rights of 
every person within their jurisdiction, without respect to nationality or 
citizenship. In Europe, a CLO has emerged with the incorporation of the 
European Convention on Human Rights [ECHR] into national law. The 
system is governed by a decentralized sovereign: a community of courts 
whose activities are coordinated through the rulings of the European 
Court of Human Rights. While imperfect and still maturing, the regime 
meets signiﬁ cant criteria of effectiveness. It routinely succeeds in raising 
national standards of rights protection; it has been crucial to the success of 
transitions to constitutional democracy in post-authoritarian states; and it 
has steadily developed capacity to render justice to all people that come 
under its jurisdiction, even those who live, and whose rights are violated, 
outside the territory of the Convention. Today, the Court is the single 
most active and important rights-protecting body in the world. The purpose 
of this paper is to explicate and defend these claims. 
 The paper builds on three strains of scholarship. First, I argue that the CLO 
ought to be conceptualized in Kantian terms, in effect, as a formalization of 
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cosmopolitan Right. Moral and political philosophy has recently 
experienced a broad revival of interest in Kant’s notions of cosmopolitanism 
(Brown  2009 ; Brown and Held  2010 ; Flikschuh  2000 ), including a 
sustained effort to build a broader, rights-based cosmopolitanism, in part 
by extending Kant’s ideas (Anderson-Gold  2001 ; Benhabib  2004 ; Held 
 2010 ). While sharing some of these orientations, I provide an account of a 
cosmopolitan legal system and how it operates. In the ﬁ eld of international 
relations, following from Doyle’s ( 1986 ) seminal paper, political scientists 
have subjected Kant’s blueprint for ‘perpetual peace’ to rigorous testing, 
with impressive results (Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller  1996 ; O’Neal and 
Russett  1999 ). This paper builds on this agenda, though its aim is to explain 
the emergence and operation of a CLO, not the absence of war between 
liberal states. 
 Second, the paper responds to a tenacious controversy concerning the 
nature and scope of human rights (Beitz  2001 ; Sajo  2004 ). Simplifying, the 
debate has focused on the tension between (1) the universalistic claims of 
rights, and (2) the diversity of culture and moral views in the world. This 
tension is typically resolved in one of two ways. Either one derives the 
content of rights from those elements that are common to moral systems, 
or conceptions of justice, across cultural divides; or one concludes that 
practices that fail to meet predetermined standards established by human 
rights are indefensible and lack legitimacy. 1 The debate has produced a 
dominant view that rights can (or should) have only minimalist content 
(Ferrara  2003 ; Ignatieff  2001 ; Rawls  1999 ; Walzer  1994 ). The view has its 
detractors (Benhabib  2009 ; Pogge  2000 ), who worry that minimalism 
drains rights of their intrinsic moral and legal force. Cohen ( 2004 : 192), a 
reluctant proponent of minimalism, puts it this way: ‘we can be tolerant of 
fundamentally different outlooks on life, or we can be ambitious in our 
understanding of what human rights demand, but we cannot – contrary 
to the aims of … activists – be both tolerant and ambitious.’ One strong 
empirical claim of the paper is that the European Court has transcended 
rights minimalism while maintaining a meaningful commitment to 
principles of national diversity and regime subsidiarity. 
 Third, the paper follows in a line of research on how new forms of judicial 
authority emerge and evolve, with what political consequences (Stone 
Sweet  1999 ). Courts famously govern not through the sword or the purse, 
but through reason-based justiﬁ cation and the propagation of argumentation 
frameworks (doctrine), to the extent that they draw non-judicial actors 
  1   The absolutist may also seek to derive the content of rights from normative arguments 
that one would be required to accept regardless of one’s moral views or cultural standpoint 
(Finnis  1980 ; Nickel  2006 ). 
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into dynamic, ‘jurisgenerative’ ﬁ elds of action (Benhabib  2009 ; Shapiro 
and Stone Sweet  2002 ). The ECHR is both a source and product of 
jurisgenerative processes, and an expansive politics of rights protection has 
been the result. The CLO is also a novel legal system, constituted on the 
basis of a structural characteristic that the paper refers to as ‘constitutional 
pluralism.’ International law scholarship now squarely confronts the 
question of how to understand both the ‘constitutional’ and ‘pluralist’ 
features of global governance arrangements (Dunoff and Trachtman  2009 ; 
Klabbers, Peters, and Ulfstein  2009 ; Krisch  2010 ). Europe possesses an 
overarching ‘constitutional’ structure, comprised of fundamental rights 
and the shared authority of judges to adjudicate individual claims. No 
single organ possesses the ‘ﬁ nal word’ when it comes to a conﬂ ict between 
conﬂ icting interpretations of rights; instead, the system develops through 
inter-court dialogue, both cooperative and competitive. 
 The paper proceeds as follows. The ﬁ rst part frames an account of the CLO 
in Kantian terms, and deﬁ nes the key concepts to be deployed:  cosmopolitan 
legal order ;  cosmopolitanism justice ;  constitutional pluralism ; and  decentralized 
sovereignty . The second part discusses how the evolution of European law 
enhanced constitutional pluralism within national legal orders, while fatally 
undermining legislative sovereignty and its corollary: the prohibition of 
judicial review of statute. In the third part, I provide an overview of how the 
CLO operates, focusing on the organ charged with managing the system: the 
European Court of Human Rights. The second and third parts give empirical 
content to the notion of a CLO, explain its emergence, and establish criteria 
for normative evaluation. Central to the account is the claim that two 
processes – the evolution of constitutional pluralism at the national level; and 
the development of rights cosmopolitanism at the transnational level – are 
causally connected to one another. The ﬁ rst process destroys traditional 
models of the national legal systems in which the notions of constitutional 
unity and centralized sovereignty overlap and reinforce one another. The 
second process generates a new, transnational legal system in which the 
judicial authority to develop and enforce fundamental rights is decentralized. 
 I. Kantian analogs 
 In  Perpetual Peace among States , Kant ( 2006 [1795]) held that in a ‘state 
of nature” nations would ﬁ nd themselves recurrently beset by conﬂ ict and 
war, and thus incapable of establishing international Public Right. Kant 
insisted that states, like individuals, could achieve peace and freedom only 
by subjecting themselves to ‘universally valid public laws’ which he associated 
with a ‘constitution’ codiﬁ ed or not. Existing constructions of sovereignty 
and international law, by contrast, supported the evils to be eradicated. 
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In his essay, Kant outlined a blueprint for achieving peace and Right. Six 
‘preliminary articles’ ban treacherous dealings among states, including 
preparation for war. States subscribing to these laws would form a security 
community in which the threat of armed conﬂ ict would be eradicated. Three 
‘deﬁ nitive articles’ establish factors deemed necessary for a cosmopolitan 
system to sustain itself over time. Partly for this reason, social scientists 
have treated these elements as variables, and Kant’s arguments as testable 
hypotheses. 
 The ﬁ rst factor (deﬁ nitive article) concerns the political organization of 
the state, which must be ‘republican.’ By republican, Kant meant a form of 
government in which executive and legislative powers are separated, 
‘equality among citizens’ secured, and tyranny avoided. Contemporary 
Kantians typically script the variable in terms of standard conceptions of 
‘liberal democracy.’ A nation that has established a competitive electoral 
system, independent courts and the rule of law, and basic market freedoms 
would be included. 
 The second factor is international organization, what Kant ( 2006 : 
78–81) characterized as the building of a ‘federalism of free states.’ Some 
states, weary with war, would choose to form a ‘league’ an association 
designed for the ‘maintenance and security’ of its members. Kant stressed 
that the federation would constrain but not extinguish ‘the power of the 
state.’ The league would not exercise coercive powers within any national 
order, and every state would be free to quit it at any time. 2 Nonetheless, to 
escape the state of nature, states must enter into federation with one 
another:
 As concerns relations among states, according to reason there can be no 
other way for them to emerge from the lawless condition, which contains 
only war, than for them to relinquish, just as do individual human 
beings, their wild (lawless) freedom, to accustom themselves to public 
binding laws, and to thereby form a state of peoples  (civitas gentium), 
which continually expanding, would ultimately comprise all the peoples 
of the world  (Kant  2006 : 81). 
 Social scientists typically operationalize the variable with reference to state 
membership in international organizations, and in the type of organizations 
to which states belong. 
  2   Among Kantian scholars, there exists a lively debate as to whether, in  Perpetual Peace 
among States , Kant rejects his earlier advocacy of a global state (Brown  2009 ; Kleingeld  2011 ; 
Pogge  2009 ). In his essay, Kant clearly advocates establishing a ‘federation of free states’ that 
would contain within it the possibility of gradually developing into a stronger state-like entity 
whose purpose is to achieve international Public Right. 
A cosmopolitan legal order  57 
 The third factor concerns the duty, born by all republican states in the 
league, to provide ‘hospitality’ to non-citizens. Kant ( 2006 : 82) deﬁ ned the 
deﬁ nitive article narrowly: ‘Hospitality means the right of a stranger not 
to be treated in a hostile manner by another upon arrival on the other’s 
territory.’ Strangers are to be welcomed, but they do not possess an 
entitlement to permanent settlement or citizenship; and, in contrast to 
citizens, a state may expel foreigners who do not abide by its laws. Kant 
( 2006 : 92) stressed that hospitality would both express and facilitate ‘a 
spirit of trade, which cannot coexist with war.’ Social scientists script 
hospitality in terms of economic interdependence, as measured by cross-
border trade and investment ﬂ ows. 
 In other writings, Kant implied that a wider range of rights are implicated 
in the notion of hospitality and cosmopolitan Right (Brown  2006 ). These 
include the freedom of an individual: ‘to establish a community with all’; 3 
to engage in trade and commercial transactions; 4 and ‘to make public 
use of one’s reason.’ 5 To be fully enjoyed, these freedoms would seem 
to require the provision of civil rights more generally. Thus, some 
cosmopolitans (Anderson-Gold  1988 ; Benhabib  2009 ) extend the concept 
of hospitality to cover the norms and discursive politics of the international 
bill of rights. 6 I treat ‘hospitality’ as a basis for recognizing fundamental 
rights, in this more expansive interpretation of Kant. As Benhabib ( 2011 ) 
puts it, rights cosmopolitanism ﬂ ows from ‘the recognition that human 
beings are moral persons equally entitled to legal protection in virtue of 
rights that accrue to them not as nationals, or members of an ethnic group, 
but as human beings as such.’ 
 The democratic peace and the cosmopolitan constitution 
 Over the past 25 years, political scientists have generated a massive research 
project designed to test Kant’s model. Although scholars continue to reﬁ ne 
methods and debate ﬁ ndings, the ‘democratic peace’ has been shown to 
be remarkably robust, and the independent causal inﬂ uence of the three 
variables (liberal democracy, international organization, and economic 
interdependence) on the outcome (the absence of war between liberal states) 
has been impressively demonstrated (O’Neal, Russett, and Berbaum 2003). 
  3   The Metaphysics of Morals (Kant  1996 (1797]: 121). 
  4   The Metaphysics of Morals (Kant  1996 : 121). 
  5   What is Enlightenment? (Kant  1994 [1784]: 55. 
  6   Including (see Appendix to Benhabib  2009 : 702): the United Nations Declaration of 
Human Rights (1948); the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Political Rights 
(1966, entry into force in 1976); and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(1966, entry into force in 1976). 
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 Peace among nations was not Kant’s only priority. Without a stable 
peace, achieving cosmopolitan Right – a rights-based, ‘international rule 
of law’ (Huntley  1996 : 49) – would not be possible. Kant deﬁ ned Right as 
‘the sum of the conditions under which the choice of one can be united 
with the choice of the other in accordance with a universal law of freedom.’ 7 
These conditions are ‘constitutional’ in that they ground the legitimacy 
of all political arrangements, including treaty-based organizations, in a 
rights-based conception of the rule of law: 8 
 The sum of the laws which need to be promulgated generally in order 
to bring about a rightful condition is  public right . Public Right is … a 
system of laws for a people, that is, a multitude of human beings, or for 
a multitude of peoples, which, because they affect one another, need a 
rightful condition under … a  constitution … so that they may enjoy 
what is laid down as Right [emphases in original]. 9 
 The cosmopolitan constitution is a set of ‘normative and juridical principles 
of … cosmopolitan Right’ (Brown  2006 : 674). We can understand these 
principles, once codiﬁ ed as positive law, as a code for universal justice that 
states voluntarily establish to realize Right. 
 Kant did not outline in any detail how a system of international public 
Right would operate, and he had little to say about courts, judicial review, 
or even of rights in the contemporary sense. We can nonetheless derive from 
Kant certain core features of a cosmopolitan legal system that are relevant 
to the ECHR. Most important for present purposes, Kant emphasized that, 
because individuals must live together in a limited space with ﬁ nite resources, 
freedom of choice will inevitably lead to social conﬂ ict; while conﬂ ict can be 
debilitating, it also provides opportunities for generating stable, legitimate 
governance. 10 Kant conceived of the domain of justice, and of the rightful 
exercise of public authority more generally, as those arrangements whose 
purpose is to determine the acceptable reasons for using state power to 
restrict an individual’s freedom in order to guarantee the freedom of all. 11 
  7   The Metaphysics of Morals (Kant  1996 : 24). 
  8   ‘A constitution allowing the greatest possible human freedom in accordance with laws 
which ensure that the freedom of each can coexist with the freedom of all the other[s], is at all 
events a necessary idea which must be made the basis not only of the ﬁ rst outline of a political 
constitution but of all laws as well’  The Metaphysics of Morals (Kant  1996 : 89). 
  9   The Metaphysics of Morals (Kant  1996 : 89). 
  10   The Metaphysics of Morals (Kant  1996 : 121–2). 
  11   ‘[I]f a certain use of freedom is itself a hindrance to freedom in accordance with universal laws 
(i.e., wrong), coercion that is opposed to this (as a hindrance of a hindrance to freedom) is consistent 
with freedom in accordance with universal laws, that is, it is right. Hence there is connected with 
right … an authorization to coerce someone who infringes upon it. … Right and authorization to 
use coercion … mean one and the same thing.’  The Metaphysics of Morals (Kant  1996 : 25–2). 
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It follows that, with few exceptions (for example, the prohibition of slavery; 
the right of access to justice) rights are not absolute. Rather, most rights 
will be subject to limitation when necessary to achieve signiﬁ cant public 
purposes. 
 The CLO’s primary mission is to render justice in this sense. Most of the 
rights that comprise the international bill of rights, the ECHR, and the 
charters of most national constitutions are, in fact, ‘qualiﬁ ed’ by limitation 
clauses; indeed, the qualiﬁ cation comprises part of the norm itself. The 
task of the European Court is to evaluate the reasons proffered by states 
to justify infringements of an individual’s Convention rights. The 
techniques which the Court has developed to do so have been crucial to 
the regime’s viability (third part below). 
 Transformation 
 Europe has experienced a deep, structural transformation since the end of 
World War II. The steady expansion of a zone of ‘liberal peace’ enabled 
the CLO to materialize. In this variation of Kant’s model, fulﬁ lling the 
three deﬁ nitive articles constitutes a precondition for the building of 
arrangements to achieve cosmopolitan Right. 
 The institutionalization of this transformation broadly conforms to the 
dictates of Kant’s model. Under NATO, Western Europe became a security 
community, in alliance with the U.S. and Canada. NATO membership 
expanded from 10 members in 1949, to 28 states today; 22 more European 
states are ‘partner countries.’ Six states established the European Coal and 
Steel Community (1952) and then the European Community (1958), 
organizations which grounded the construction of market federalism, 
a supranational regulatory system, and a corpus of fundamental rights. 
Today, the European Union [EU] (1993) trades more with the rest of the 
world than does any other member of the World Trade Organization; and 
each of its 27 member states exports more to markets within the EU than 
to all global markets combined. The Council of Europe, founded by 
ten states in 1949, completed negotiations of the ECHR in 1950, and the 
Convention entered into force in 1953. With Protocol No. 11 (entry into 
force on November 1, 1998), all of the High Contracting Parties accepted 
the right of individuals to petition the Strasbourg Court, as well as the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court to adjudicate these claims. The 
Convention system is truly pan-European, covering 47 states with a 
population exceeding 800 million people. 
 At the national level, the change that matters most concerns the status 
of fundamental rights. Prior to World War II, only a handful of high courts 
in the world had any experience with constitutional judicial review: the 
 60  alec stone sweet
authority to invalidate statutes and other acts of public authority that 
conﬂ ict with constitutional norms. After World War II, Western Europe 
became the epicenter of a ‘new constitutionalism’ (Stone Sweet  2010a ) 
which, with successive waves of democratization, spread across the 
Continent. The basic formula – an entrenched, written constitution; a 
charter of rights; and a mode of constitutional judicial review (typically a 
specialized constitutional court) to protect those rights – was replicated in 
every new European constitution adopted since 1949. 12 
 Kant’s model is dynamic: important outcomes – including peace, 
economic interdependence, and arrangements for rendering cosmopolitan 
justice – can be reached only through learning and adaptation (Cederman 
 2001 ). The momentous changes just discussed interact with one 
another in complex ways, one result of which is an increasingly structured 
interface between national and international politics. As rights-based 
constitutionalism migrated to states in Southern Europe, and then across 
Central and Eastern Europe, membership in NATO, the EU, and the ECHR 
expanded. As the ECHR evolved into a CLO, the impact of the Convention, 
too, was registered on multiple levels at once, including the activities of 
individuals, the decision making of governmental organs, and the content 
and dispositions of national and international law. 
 Concepts 
 While framed in Kantian terms, my account of the CLO in Europe is meant 
to stand on its own, that is, it does not depend upon its derivability from, 
or ﬁ delity to, Kant. Most important, I argue that constitutional pluralism 
and rights cosmopolitanism have been co-constitutive of one another in 
ways that can be charted and assessed. Before turning to the empirics, 
further elaboration of concepts is in order. 
 By  rights cosmopolitanism , I mean the recognition of a legal duty to provide 
justice under the cosmopolitan constitution. A CLO is a legal system in which 
all public ofﬁ cials bear an obligation to respect the fundamental rights of 
every person within their jurisdiction. For courts, this obligation entails 
rendering justice in the Kantian sense just discussed. The ECHR occupies a 
central strategic position in the CLO, given that individuals have an unfettered 
right to petition the Court once national remedies have been exhausted. 
 Constitutional pluralism is a structural characteristic of a legal system. 
Within the domestic constitutional order, the term refers to a situation in 
  12   The exception is the Constitution of the French Fifth Republic (1958) which did not 
contain a charter of rights. In 1971, the Constitutional Council began incorporating rights into 
the constitution, and this process was completed by the end of the 1970s (Stone  1992 ). 
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which two or more sources of judicially-enforceable rights co-exist. In 
many national legal systems, three such sources – national constitutional 
rights, EU rights, and the ECHR – overlap. Individuals have a choice of 
which source to plead, and judges have a choice of which right to enforce. 
These choices have consequences, as when national judges prefer to apply 
European rights, rather than their own constitution law, as a means of 
raising standards of protection. 
 The term,  constitutional pluralism , also refers to systemic features of the 
CLO. The fact that ECHR maps onto rights found in national systems 
undergirds the notion of a multi-level constitutionalism (Kumm  2009 : 
303–10; Petersmann  2006 ): no act taken by any public authority, at any 
level of governance, can be considered lawful if it violates a fundamental 
right. This notion of multi-level constitutionalism, too, can be tied to 
Kant. 13 The structure of authority within this presupposed constitution is 
pluralistic, in that the system is comprised of discrete hierarchies, national 
and Treaty-based, each of which has a claim to autonomy and legitimacy. 
In Europe today, judges intensively interact with one another across 
jurisdictional boundaries with reference to questions of rights adjudication 
that they collectively confront. 
 This paper examines the construction of a pluralistic, constitutional 
system, a momentous outcome given legacies of the past. In Europe, 
traditional models of the juridical state are grounded not in notions of 
legal pluralism, but  sovereignty . 14 These models depict the legal system as 
hierarchically organized, with one organ positioned to defend the integrity 
of the hierarchy of norms that constitutes it. This organ is considered to 
  13   As Flikschuh ( 2000 : 170) emphasizes: ‘Kant does not share the widespread view that we 
can turn our attention to the issue of cosmopolitan Right only  after we have settled the matter 
of domestic justice. The grounds of cosmopolitan justice are identical with those of domestic 
justice: both follow from the claim to external freedom of each other under conditions of 
unavoidable empirical constraints. Instead of distinguishing between different theories of justice 
for the domestic and international contexts, Kant refers to different  levels of institutionalizing 
his cosmopolitan conception of Right.’ 
  14   I deﬁ ne  sovereignty in narrow, juridical terms, as the formal capacity to make and 
enforce legal norms. In the international system, states are sovereign in that they are entered into 
binding agreements with other states and incur duties under international law. Domestically, 
sovereignty refers to the authority to make and enforce legal norms within the jurisdictional 
boundaries of the state. The constitutions of liberal states distribute sovereignty among 
governmental organs, specify procedures for making and enforcing law, and stipulate 
restrictions on the exercise of public authority through rights. Treaties of the kind discussed in 
this paper ‘pool’ state sovereignty in order to achieve common purposes. In the EU and the 
Council of Europe, states have endowed supranational organizations, including the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) with compulsory 
jurisdiction over state acts that come within the purview of rights found in EU law and the 
Convention respectively. 
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be the repository of  centralized sovereignty , to the extent that it possesses 
a monopoly on the authority to resolve certain legal questions. In the 
archetypal cases, a constitutional court (under rights-based constitutionalism) 
or a parliament (under a regime of legislative sovereignty) are considered to 
possess the ultimate authority to resolve issues involving the validity of, or 
conﬂ ict among, legal norms within the system. 
 A CLO is a legal system in which fundamental rights are enforced by a 
‘decentralized sovereign’ a concept that I adapt from Smith ( 2008 ). The 
regime is not hierarchically constructed with one jurisdiction positioned to 
render a ‘ﬁ nal word’ on questions of legal validity at each level of governance. 
From an internal perspective given by the Convention, the European Court 
is the authoritative interpreter of Convention rights. The Court, however, 
does not possess the authority to invalidate national measures that conﬂ ict 
with the Convention. If and how the Court’s rulings are ‘implemented’ in 
the national legal order depends entirely on the decision making of national 
ofﬁ cials under national rules. What makes the system ‘constitutional’ is an 
overarching normative structure: the code of rights that ofﬁ cials are under 
a legal duty to enforce; and a set of shared techniques that judges, in 
particular, have developed to adjudicate rights. In the decentralized model, 
as Smith ( 2008 : 43) puts it, ‘there is no single hierarchy that encompasses 
the entire political order, but instead a series of related hierarchies.’ In 
Europe, states have pooled and then distributed sovereignty in such a way 
as to create a layered set of ‘nodes’ of judicial authority to protect rights. 
Each of these nodes is autonomous; yet the cosmopolitan order exists only 
in so far as national judges credit their roles in a common project. 
 A system of decentralized sovereignty 15 suffers from two generic 
coordination problems that centralized sovereignty was meant to resolve 
(Smith  2008 : 427–9). The ﬁ rst problem concerns the source of systemic 
order, which is resolved by the pre-supposed constitution (Gardbaum 
 2008 ): the overarching framework of fundamental rights that underpins 
cosmopolitan constitutionalism. The second problem is one of overlapping 
competences: each high court is under a duty to resolve disputes within the 
same domain, that of the cosmopolitan constitution. In the CLO, 
overlapping competences count as a good in so far as individuals (a) have 
multiple points of access to the decentralized sovereign, and (b) healthy 
competition among nodes of authority serves to upgrade, rather than 
reduce, a collective commitment to rights protection. 
  15   From the point of view of centralized sovereignty, the notion of ‘decentralized 
sovereignty’ may seem nonsense, an oxymoron. At the very least, how the regime has evolved, 
post-Protocol No. 11 and incorporation, requires us to reconsider the concept of sovereignty, 
perhaps rejecting it altogether. 
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 II. Constitutional pluralism and national legal systems 
 The CLO in Europe is comprised of three interlocking elements. First, 
individuals are able to plead fundamental rights, including the Convention, 
before national judges. Although the ECHR does not require incorporation 
into the domestic order, all 47 states have now done so, in ways that make 
it binding on all public authorities and enforceable by national judges 
( Appendix 1 ). Second, national systems of rights protection are formally 
linked to a realm of rights adjudication beyond the state: every individual, 
regardless of citizenship, possesses an unfettered right to petition the 
European Court, once national remedies have been exhausted. Third, the 
ECHR comprises an autonomous source of rights doctrine. The Court 
treats the Convention as a ‘living’ instrument, which is interpreted and 
applied in order to secure the effectiveness of rights, as society evolves. 16 
States have no means of blocking applications or the Court’s rulings, 
which are ﬁ nal (there is no appeal). 17 
 In this section, I describe the development of constitutional pluralism 
within the  domestic order, a process that removed obstacles to the 
emergence of the CLO. Most important, it destroyed the constitutional 
dogmas associated with legislative sovereignty, crucially, the prohibition 
of judicial review of statutes. 
 The supremacy of EU law and judicial review 
 Constitutional pluralism ﬁ rst emerged in Europe with the consolidation of 
the doctrines of the  direct effect and  supremacy of EU law, announced by 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the 1960s. As a massive literature 
has demonstrated (Stone Sweet  2010b ), acceptance of these doctrines by 
national courts integrated the EU and national systems in complex ways, 
‘constitutionalizing’ the regime. The EC Treaty originally contained no 
supremacy clause, and the member states did not provide for the direct 
effect of Treaty provisions or directives. The doctrine of direct effect 
entitles individuals to plead entitlements found in the treaties and in 
directives (EU statutes that member states are obliged to ‘transpose’ into 
national law) before national courts. The doctrine of supremacy requires 
that national judges resolve any conﬂ ict between domestic law and EU law 
with reference, and deference, to the latter. The ECJ justiﬁ ed these moves 
  16   Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary Objections), Application no. 15318/89, ECHR Judgment 
of March 23, 1995. 
  17   States, within three months following a Chamber judgment, may request referral of the 
case to a 17-member Grand Chamber. Such requests may be accepted by a ﬁ ve-judge committee, 
but only on an ‘exceptional’ basis, see the  Rules of Court , Rule 73. 
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on the grounds that the Treaty constituted an ‘autonomous’ legal order 
conferring rights onto individuals (Stein  1981 ). 
 Supremacy challenged the prohibition of judicial review in that it 
required judges to refuse to apply any norm, including statutory provisions, 
found to be in conﬂ ict with EU law. By 1989, every high court in the EU 
had accepted supremacy, and the courts of new member states quickly 
joined them. The result: all judges acquired the power of judicial review of 
statute, albeit only in areas governed by EU law, authority otherwise 
denied to most courts under national constitutional law. In systems in 
which a constitutional court defends the primacy of the constitution and 
rights, the ECJ’s case law fatally undermined the presumed monopoly of 
the constitutional judge to determine the conditions under which the 
ordinary (non-constitutional) could refuse to apply relevant statute. 18 
 The politics of supremacy involved signiﬁ cant inter-judicial conﬂ ict 
(Alter  2001 ; Slaughter, Stone Sweet, and Weiler  1998 ). The ECJ had placed 
no limits on the doctrine’s scope: the most banal provision of an EU directive 
trumps every conﬂ icting statute, as well as the most sacred provisions of the 
constitution. Under a regime of supremacy, each extension of EU law 
would potentially create a gap in national rights protection. In 1974, 
the German Federal Constitutional Court (GFCC) reacted, declaring 
that it would review the implementation of directly effective EU law, 
upon referrals from the ordinary courts and individuals, ‘so long as the 
integration process has not progressed so far that Community law also 
possesses a catalogue of rights ... of settled validity, which is adequate in 
comparison with a catalogue of fundamental rights contained in the 
[German] constitution.’ 19 In response, the ECJ actively developed such a 
catalogue, in the guise of (unwritten, judge-made) general principles 
inspired by the ECHR and ‘the constitutional traditions common to the 
member states.’ In 1986, the GFCC withdrew its objections ‘so long as the 
[EU], and in particular the ECJ, generally ensures an effective protection of 
fundamental rights.’ 20 These ‘dialogues’ and others that followed, did not 
destroy supremacy; rather, they served to upgrade standards of protection 
and the authority of courts at both the national and EU levels of governance. 
 While it may be argued that the supremacy doctrine constituted a 
sovereignty claim on the part of the ECJ, no national constitutional court 
has accepted supremacy as the ECJ understands it. The ECJ, in effect, holds 
that all national judges are agents of the EU legal order, not the national 
  18   Following from  Simmenthal II , ECJ 106/77 [1978] ECR 629. 
  19   Solange I , BVerfGE 34, 269 (1974). 
  20   Solange II , BVerfGE 73, 339 (1987). 
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order, whenever they act in domains that fall within the scope of EU law. 
The ECJ further asserts that it alone possesses the ultimate authority to 
determine the compatibility of EU law with fundamental rights. 21 
National constitutional courts assert that EU law – including the doctrine 
of supremacy – enters into national law through their own constitution, 
and does not deprive them of their own ‘ﬁ nal word’ on the constitutionality 
of EU acts. This ‘jurisprudence of constitutional conﬂ ict’ (Kumm  2005 ) is 
a manifestation, probably permanent, of the pluralistic structure of EU law. 
 On the ground, most ordinary courts, including supreme courts, routinely 
behave as faithful agents of the EU order when they adjudicate EU law. 22 
Some go further, overtly leveraging the ECJ in order to expand their own 
authority and to subvert that of the domestic constitutional order. In the 
area of workplace discrimination, for example, the German labor courts 
successfully engaged the ECJ in a joint effort to raise national standards of 
rights protection. The GFCC, which had chosen not to aggressively confront 
discrimination based on sex and age, lost these skirmishes and was forced 
to adapt, along with every other court in the EU (Stone Sweet and Stranz 
 2012 ). Today, across Europe, EU fundamental rights are a more important 
source of non-discrimination law than are national constitutions. 
 Although elected ofﬁ cials have at times sought to constrain the courts, 
these efforts failed. In the end, governments too adapted. With the 
Maastricht Treaty on European Union (1993), the member states revised 
the Treaty of Rome, echoing the Court’s seminal case law: ‘the Union shall 
respect fundamental rights as guaranteed by the European Convention on 
Human Rights ... and as they result from the constitutional traditions 
common to the member states as general principles of Community law.’ In 
2009, the member states promulgated a Charter of Rights and accepted 
for the ﬁ rst time the basics of the supremacy doctrine. 23 As part of this 
reform, the EU began formal negotiations to accede to the ECHR in 2011. 
Accession will further strengthen the ECHR and its Court, adding another 
layer of pluralism to EU law, and formally integrating the EU’s multi-level 
structure into the CLO. 
 The domestiﬁ cation of the Convention 
 In 1950, when the ECHR was signed, Ireland was the only member of the 
Council of Europe with any meaningful experience with rights review. The 
  21   Foto Frost , ECJ 314/85 [1987] ECR 4199. 
  22   With the enormous expansion of EU law over the past 40 years, national legal autonomy 
has been all but extinguished in many important policy domains (Kelemen  2010 ). 
  23   While the ECJ’s fundamental rights jurisprudence remains in place, rights-oriented 
litigation is likely to increase substantially under the Charter. 
 66  alec stone sweet
constitutions of Belgium, France, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, and the 
UK did not include a charter of rights and/or prohibited the judicial review 
of statutes. Norway’s constitution (1814) contained a handful of rights 
and permitted judicial review, but few if any important laws had ever been 
found to have violated these rights. The German and the Italian 
constitutional courts were still being designed. Not surprisingly, a majority 
of states rejected proposals to grant individuals a right of petition, and to 
accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the European Court (which began 
operation only in 1959). With Protocol No. 11 (1998), states embraced a 
robust legal regime. Two factors were crucial. First, the development of 
EU law gave national ofﬁ cials, including judges, a chance to adjust to new 
forms of judicial power under constitutional pluralism. By the end of the 
1980s, every high court in the EU had accepted supremacy, and judicial 
review of statute under the supremacy doctrine had become routine. 
Second, the Soviet bloc collapsed. In the 1990s, with constitutional 
reconstruction in full swing, the EU and the Council of Europe offered 
admission to post-Communist states on the basis of certain conditions, 
including a commitment to rights protection. Locking them into the 
ECHR, and placing them under the supervision of its Court, was an 
obvious means of securing that commitment. 
 Protocol No. 11 confers upon the Court compulsory jurisdiction over 
individual petitions that claim a violation of Convention rights, after 
exhausting national remedies. If the Court ﬁ nds a violation, it may award 
monetary damages. Unlike a national constitutional court, the Court has 
no authority to invalidate a national norm that conﬂ icts with the 
Convention. In the 1970s, the regime received only 163 individual petitions, 
rising to 455 in the 1980s. Under Protocol No. 11, the number of petitions 
exploded. In 1999, the Registry of the Court received 8,400 complaints, a 
ﬁ gure that has increased every year thereafter. In 2010, the Court registered 
61,300 applications. Although some 96% of all petitions will be ruled 
inadmissible for one reason or another, the Court is overloaded. The 
annual rate of judgments on the merits shows a similar trend. Through 
1982, the Court had issued, in its history, only 61 full rulings pursuant to 
applications by individuals. In 1999, it rendered 250 judgments; 1,200 in 
2005; and 2,607 in 2010. 24 Under Protocol No. 11, the Strasbourg Court 
is the most active rights-protecting court in the world. 
 The CLO is a product of Protocol No. 11 and the incorporation of the 
ECHR into domestic legal orders. As  Appendix 1 documents, domestiﬁ cation 
of the Convention proceeded via different routes: express constitutional 
provision (Austria, many post-Communist states); judicial interpretation 
  24   Statistics reported on the Court’s website:  http :// www . echr . coe . int / echr / . 
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of constitutional provisions related to treaty law generally (most states in 
Western Europe); or special statutes (UK, Ireland, and Scandinavian 
states). With incorporation, all national courts in the system are capable of 
enforcing the Convention: individuals can plead the ECHR at national bar 
against any act of public authority; judges are under a duty to identify 
statutes that conﬂ ict with Convention rights, and to interpret statutes in 
lights of the ECHR to avoid conﬂ icts whenever possible; and virtually all 
courts may refuse to apply statutes that conﬂ ict with Convention rights, 
with the notable exception of those in the UK and Ireland. 
 Incorporation is an inherently constitutional process: it subverted 
centralized sovereignty at the national level, while provoking dynamics of 
systemic construction at the transnational level. The Convention quickly 
developed into a ‘shadow’ or ‘surrogate’ constitution (Keller and Stone 
Sweet  2008 ) in every state that did not possess its own judicially-enforceable 
charter of rights (including original signatories, Belgium, France, The 
Netherlands, Switzerland, and the UK). In the 1990s, Finland, Norway, 
and Sweden enacted new Bills of Rights, closely modeled on (and invoking) 
the ECHR, in order to ﬁ ll gaps in their own constitutions. 
 In those states that possess, at least on paper, relatively complete systems 
of constitutional justice, incorporation provides supplementary protection. 
We ﬁ nd this situation in Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, 
Turkey, and in the post-Communist states. The Spanish Constitutional 
Tribunal, for example, enforces the ECHR as quasi-constitutional norms 
(Candela Soriano  2008 ). The Tribunal will strike down statutes that 
violate the Convention as  per se unconstitutional; it interprets Spanish 
constitutional rights in light of the ECHR, wherever possible; and it has 
ordered the ordinary courts to abide by the Strasbourg Court’s jurisprudence 
as a matter of  constitutional obligation, including case law generated by 
litigation not involving Spain. If the judiciary ignores the Court’s 
jurisprudence, individuals can appeal directly to the Tribunal for redress. 
Nonetheless, the Tribunal insists that in the event of an irreconcilable 
conﬂ ict between the ECHR and the Spanish Constitution, the latter will 
prevail – a common position among constitutional courts. 25 In many post-
Communist states, as well, constitutional judges invoke the Strasbourg 
Court’s jurisprudence as authority, in order to enhance the status of 
fundamental rights – and hence their own positions – in the domestic 
context (Hammer and Emmert  2011 ). 
 Strikingly, some states give the Convention constitutional rank (e.g., 
Albania, Austria, Slovenia); and, in The Netherlands, the ECHR enjoys 
  25   In systems in which such doctrines hold sway, a model of centralized sovereignty (section 
I.C) can usually be constructed from the internal perspective of the national constitutional court. 
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supra-constitutional status. In Belgium, the Constitutional Court has 
determined that the ECHR possesses supra-legislative but infra-constitutional 
rank, while the Supreme Court holds that the ECHR possesses supra-
constitutional status, thereby enhancing its autonomy vis-à-vis the 
Constitutional Court. 
 One could continue in this vein, but the basic point has been made. 
The incorporation of the ECHR generated constitutional pluralism and 
inter-judicial competition within the national order; 26 it destroyed doctrines 
that underpinned centralized sovereignty (e.g., legislative supremacy, the 
monopoly of constitutional courts over the domain of rights protection); 
and it enhanced judicial power with respect to legislative and executive 
power. 
 Transformation 
 Constitutional pluralism expands the discretionary authority of courts. 
Many judges will now refuse to apply law that conﬂ icts with the Convention; 
at the same time, they are rapidly abandoning traditional methods of 
statutory interpretation. Instead of seeking to discern legislative intent, 
judges increasingly favor the purposive construction of statutes in light of 
fundamental rights jurisprudence. In systems in which multiple, functionally-
differentiated, high courts co-exist (the majority of states), pluralism means 
that the supreme courts of ordinary jurisdiction may assume the mantle 
of  de facto constitutional courts whenever they review the  Conventionality 
of statutes. France, which for two centuries famously embraced and 
propagated the dogmas of the General Will (legislative sovereignty and the 
prohibition of judicial review), is now a robust example of pluralism. 27 
From the point of view of the rights claimant, the Supreme Civil Court 
( Cour de Cassation ) and the Council of State (the supreme administrative 
court) function as the ‘real’ constitutional courts; and litigants and judges 
treat the Convention as the ‘real’ charter of rights. The outcome is dictated 
  26   The most obvious cases of internal constitutional pluralism are systems in which one 
ﬁ nds both (1) a constitutional court which considers, as a matter of national constitutional law, 
that it alone possesses the authority to invalidate statutes that conﬂ ict with constitutional 
rights, and (2) one or several supreme courts which may refuse to apply statutes in conﬂ ict with 
rights found in EU law or the Convention. Today, classic distinctions between the constitutional 
and ordinary courts, themselves derived from traditional models of legislative sovereignty, are 
on the verge of extinction (see Garlicki  2007 ). 
  27   Article 55 of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic provides for the primacy of 
international treaty law over conﬂ icting statutes, but separation of powers doctrines – the 
prohibition of judicial review of statute – rendered Article 55 without effect in the courts. 
Beginning in the 1970s, the courts gradually overthrew the prohibition. 
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by the fact that individuals have no direct access to the Constitutional 
Council; 28 and it is the European Court, not the Constitutional Council, 
that supervises the rights-protecting activities of the civil and administrative 
courts. Today, three autonomous high courts protect fundamental rights 
on an ongoing basis; and there is no formal means of coordinating rights 
doctrine, or of resolving conﬂ icts, among these courts. Without revising 
the constitution or exiting the ECHR, French ofﬁ cials are now locked into 
a pluralist system of rights protection. 
 Some of the most powerful states in Western Europe have had the 
greatest difﬁ culty incorporating the ECHR to permit judges to enforce it 
against statute. In legal terms, the structural problem concerns the fact 
that in so-called ‘dualist’ systems – including original signatories, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Sweden, Norway, and the UK – constitutions confer upon 
treaty law the same rank as statute. In such systems, conﬂ icts between 
statutes and treaty provisions are expected to be resolved according to the 
rule,  lex posterior derogat legi priori . The rule is anathema to a CLO, since 
legislation adopted after the transposition of the ECHR into national law 
would normally be immune from review under the Convention. What is 
critical for the emergence of the CLO is that, in these states, the rule has 
been relaxed or overridden altogether. 
 In Italy, at least until the late 1960s, ‘Italian courts refused to apply the 
Convention considering its provisions to be merely programmatic’ (Candela 
Soriano  2008 : 405). In the past decade, courts incorporated the Convention, 
destroying the  lex posterior rule and producing a pluralist order. In 2004, 
the Supreme Court ( Cassazione ) began treating the Convention as directly 
applicable, while in 2007, the Italian Constitutional Court (ICC) struck 
down a statute (concerning expropriation) as unconstitutional on the 
grounds that it violated property rights under the Convention (Candela 
Soriano  2008 : 405–6). In its decision, the ICC held that Italian judges are 
required to interpret national law in light of the ECHR and, where a 
conﬂ ict is unavoidable, to refer the matter to the ICC. Some judges have 
chosen to ignore this jurisprudence. In 2008, for example, a court of appeal 
decided on its own authority to refuse to apply a controlling statute on 
grounds that it was incompatible with the Convention (reported in 
Andenæs and Bjørge  2011 : 37–8). The situation has given rise to a ﬁ erce 
debate: does the ECHR enjoy supra-legislative but infra-constitutional 
rank (the ICC’s position) or constitutional status (the position of some 
  28   In 2008, the French Constitution was revised to permit the Supreme Court and the 
Council of State to refer laws to the Constitutional Council for review, in the context of ongoing 
litigation. 
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civil courts and scholars)? This is yet another example of constitutional 
pluralism in action. 
 In Germany, overcoming the  lex posterior rule has been tortuous 
(Lambert Abdelgawad and Weber  2008 ). Not until 1987 did the GFCC 
directly confront the problem, holding that German statutes, regardless of 
their date of adoption, must be ‘interpreted and applied in harmony’ with 
the Convention. 29 In its  Görgülü decision (2005), 30 the GFCC repudiated 
the ‘traditional theory’ according to which the Strasbourg’s Court’s 
judgments did not bind the domestic organs of government, including 
the courts (Hoffmeister  2006 : 728–9). The ruling establishes a strong 
presumption that judges are to apply the Court’s jurisprudence when it is 
on point, except in ‘exceptional’ circumstances, namely, when ‘it is the 
only way to avoid a violation of the fundamental principles contained in 
the Constitution.’ 31 As important, the GFCC’s ruling expanded the 
constitutional complaint procedure: individuals can now challenge (as a 
violation of their constitutional rights) judicial rulings that ignore or fail to 
properly take into account the European Court’s case law. While  Görgülü 
signiﬁ cantly bolstered the status of the ECHR within the domestic order, 
the GFCC also noted that it would settle any conﬂ ict between the Basic 
Law and the ECHR in terms of the former. 
 In 2011, the GFCC declared that the ECHR and the European Court’s 
case law comprise interpretive ‘aids for the determination of the contents 
and scope of the fundamental rights and of rule-of-law principles 
enshrined in the Basic Law.’ Like  Görgülü , the GFCC’s  Preventive Detention 
ruling 32 ended a convoluted saga involving a direct conﬂ ict between the 
German courts and the European Court. In 2009, in  M v. Germany , the 
Strasbourg Court had held that German law allowing the further detention 
of convicted criminals after they had served their prison sentences violated 
the ECHR. The GFCC had upheld the constitutionality of the relevant 
statute in 2004, in so far as such detention was deemed necessary to protect 
public security. When the GFCC appeared reluctant to change its position 
following the  M judgment, the European Court issued a series of rulings 
ﬁ nding the same violation. In  Prevention Detention , the GFCC overturned 
its 2004 ruling, on the grounds that the Strasbourg’s court’s case law had 
constituted a signiﬁ cant ‘change in the legal situation.’ The Court then went 
on to ground the Basic Law’s ‘openness’ to the Convention in Article 1.2 of 
the Basic Law (which recognizes human rights as foundational principles). 
  29   BVerfGE 74, 358 (370). 
  30   BVerfGE 111, 307. 
  31   BVerfGE 111, 307 (para 35). 
  32   Preventive Detention , No. 2 BvR 2365/09 (May 4, 2011). 
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As a result, all organs of the state are under a duty ‘not only to take into 
account’ the ECHR in their decisions, but ‘to avoid conﬂ ict’ between it 
and national law. ‘The openness of the Basic Law’ the GFCC stated, 
‘expresses an understanding of sovereignty that not only does not oppose 
international and supranational integration, it presupposes and expects 
[integration].’ 
 By formally recognizing the overlapping nature of fundamental rights in 
Europe, the GFCC has taken a cosmopolitan position. In  Görgülü , the 
GFCC had already declared that its own rights protecting role is exercised 
‘indirectly in the service’ of the Convention, an engagement that both 
protects Germany from ﬁ ndings of violations and ‘contributes to promoting 
a joint European development of fundamental rights.’ 33 In  Preventive 
Detention , the GFCC acknowledged a dialogic relationship with the 
Strasbourg Court, without abandoning its position on the primacy of the 
Basic Law: ‘The fact that the German constitution has the ﬁ nal word is not 
incompatible with an international and European dialogue between courts, 
rather it [comprises the dialogue’s] normative foundation.’ 34 In June 2011, 
two months after  Preventive Detention , the European Court responded 
favorably, ﬁ nding no violation in a related case,  Mork v. Germany (2011). 
The Court noted: ‘In its judgment, the GFCC stressed that the fact that the 
Constitution stood above the Convention in the domestic hierarchy of 
norms was not an obstacle to … dialogue between the courts’ and that ‘in 
its reasoning, [the GFCC] relied on the interpretation … of the Convention 
made by this Court in its judgment in the case of  M. v. Germany .’ 35 The 
outcome illustrates one basic mechanism – dialogue among autonomous 
courts – through which decentralized sovereignty can increase the effectiveness 
of the ECHR. 
 In two states – Ireland and the UK – the  lex posterior rule has also been 
relaxed, although no judge is authorized to set aside legislation conﬂ icting 
with the Convention (Besson  2008 ). Pursuant to the ECHR Act (2003), 
Irish ofﬁ cials are under a duty to respect and enforce the Convention, and 
individuals can plead it against all acts of public authority, except those 
of Parliament and the courts. Under the UK Human Rights Act (2000), 
  33   Preventive Detention (para 61). 
  34   Preventive Detention (para 89). 
  35   Mork v. Germany , Applications nos. 31047/04 and 43386/08, Judgment of June 9, 2011 
(para 31). In  Schmitz v. Germany , App. No. 30493/04, Judgment of June 9, 2011 (para 41), 
the Court noted that the GFCC had reversed its earlier case law and declared that the 
Court ‘welcomes the [GFCC’s] approach of interpreting the provisions of the Basic Law also 
in the light of the Convention and this Court’s case-law, which demonstrates that court’s 
continuing commitment to the protection of fundamental rights not only on national, but also 
on European level.’ 
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individuals may challenge all acts, including Parliamentary legislation; if a 
Parliamentary statute is found to be incompatible with the ECHR, the 
high courts are obligated to issue a ruling of incompatibility – but they 
may not set aside the offending legislative provisions. Declarations of 
incompatibility are addressed to the Parliament, which must indicate what 
remedial legislation, if any, will be proposed. In Ireland, the high courts 
may also issue rulings of incompatibility, although Parliament is not 
obliged to respond to them. 36 In Norway and Sweden, which incorporated 
the ECHR through human rights statutes in the 1990s, the courts must 
give primacy to the Convention when in a conﬂ ict with legislation (Wiklund 
2008). In the past decade, Norwegian courts in particular have positioned 
themselves to become active participants in the development of Convention 
rights (Andenæs and Bjørge  2011 : 15–17). 
 While the dynamics of incorporation are heavily mediated by 
constitutional provisions and doctrine, important strategic interests have 
been catalysts. In the 1990s, incorporation constituted a formal means 
for post-Communist states to signal their commitment to the massive 
institutional reforms being demanded by Western states. As a growing 
scholarly literature has shown, the ECHR has played a crucial role in 
democratic transitions after 1989 (Buyse and Hamilton  2011 ; Hammert 
and Emmer  2011 ). New bills of rights were modeled on the ECHR, with 
an eye towards future membership in the EU and the Council of Europe; 
and some states even signed the ECHR prior to ratifying new constitutions 
(including Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Poland, Slovakia, and 
Ukraine). For the core states of Western Europe, folding the post-Communist 
states into the ECHR also fulﬁ lled important strategic interests. Protocol 
No. 11 reconstructed the regime, making it an extraordinarily efﬁ cient 
mechanism for monitoring the functioning of post-Communist states. 
For Western states, the cost of Protocol No. 11 is enhanced supervision 
of their own rights-regarding activities, a cost they have thus far been 
willing to pay. 
 III. The ECHR as a cosmopolitan legal order 
 The European Court performs three governance functions. It (1) renders 
justice to individual applicants, beyond the state (a justice function); (2) it 
supervises the respect for fundamental rights on the part of state ofﬁ cials 
  36   Although a surface commitment to Parliamentary sovereignty survives, constitutional 
pluralism has nonetheless emerged. The courts may apply EU law, including EU fundamental 
rights and the Charter, against conﬂ icting legislation; the Parliament, however, may choose not 
to harmonize legislation with the Convention in the face of a declaration of incompatibility. 
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(a monitoring function), and (3) it determines the scope and content of 
Convention rights, in light of state practice within the Cosmopolitan 
commons (an oracular, or lawmaking, function). The CLO is a pluralistic: 
sources of rights and jurisdiction overlap. The Court regards the ECHR as 
a type of transnational constitution, 37 but it does not exercise sovereignty 
within national orders. The Court’s case law gains inﬂ uence domestically 
through the complicity of national ofﬁ cials. 
 In this section, I argue that the regime and its Court meet signiﬁ cant 
criteria of effectiveness, despite being overloaded. The Court has transcended 
‘rights minimalism’ grounded an expansive jurisgenerativity within national 
legal orders, and helped to consolidate a rights-based constitutionalism in 
new, post-authoritarian democracies. Further, the Court has proved capable 
of rendering justice without regard to the nationality of the petitioner or 
the territory on which rights violations occur; and it admits to no gaps in 
protection under the guise of a ‘political questions’ doctrine, even with 
respect to the conduct of war and international politics. 
 Beyond minimalism 
 The Court routinely generates new rights and expands the scope of existing 
ones, placing even powerful states out of compliance with the Convention. 
This outcome has not inﬂ uenced the philosophical discourse on rights, 
which remains dominated by minimalist precepts, and there are good 
reasons for wonderment. Most of the original signatories of the Convention 
assumed that the treaty enshrined minimalism, thereby affording substantial 
latitude in how states would balance public interests and rights (Nichol 
 2005 ). One might also suppose that a transnational court would have 
weaker political legitimacy in comparison with national courts. After all, 
the typical national judge is embedded in a liberal democratic order, and 
s/he is a native of the legal system in which the rights conﬂ ict has taken 
place. The transnational judge’s gaze, in contrast, is an alien presence. 
Why has this situation not led to a jurisprudence of rights minimalism? 
 The answer lies in how decentralized sovereignty operates. Three factors 
deserve emphasis. First, the Court expends great resources to convince 
its audience that it fully understands the richness and particularity of the 
dispute, as well as variation in the relevant national law across the regime. 
In its rulings, the Court carefully traces the process through which individuals 
exhausted remedies, and it dwells on the arguments briefed by the defendant 
state and others ﬁ ling as  amici . Findings of violation may not convince 
  37   The Court has itself called the ECHR ‘a constitutional document’ of European public 
law,  Loizidou v. Turkey , op cit. 
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states, but it is not plausible to argue that the Court has ignored domestic 
law and context. The practice also helps the Court provide guidance on 
how violating states should change their laws, which it now does routinely 
when the source of a violation is a general legal norm or practice (Sadurski 
 2009 ). 
 Second, the Court has developed a doctrinal framework – proportionality 
analysis (PA) – to adjudicate virtually all Convention rights, and it insists 
that all national courts use it as well. PA is tailor-made for the adjudication 
of qualiﬁ ed rights in a pluralist setting, and it is the crucial mechanism of 
coordination in the cosmopolitan order (Kumm  2004 ; Stone Sweet and 
Mathews  2008 ). In the standard sequence, once a judge determines that 
a right is in play, s/he then veriﬁ es (a) that the measure was properly 
designed to achieve a state purpose (means are rationally related to 
legitimate ends), and (b) that the measure does not infringe more on the 
right than is  necessary to achieve objectives (a test for least-restrictive 
alternatives). Even a law that passes the ﬁ rst two prongs of the test may 
nonetheless fail a third phase of PA: balancing in the strict sense. In the 
balancing phase, the judge weighs the cost to the right claimant against the 
beneﬁ ts of the measure in light of the facts. The European Court typically 
balances within necessity analysis, collapsing the second and third stages. 
Thus, how any qualiﬁ ed right is actually enforced will always be contingent 
upon local law and context, while the state that would infringe a right 
bears the burden of justifying the necessity of the means chosen. What is 
common across the national systems that comprise the CLO is not a list of 
norms deﬁ ned in a lowest-common denominator manner, but a mode of 
argumentation, and justiﬁ cation: the proportionality framework. 
 The Court uses PA, in part, to determine how much discretion – the 
‘margin of appreciation’ in the jargon – states should have in infringing a 
right for public purposes. In practice, the Court combines PA with a simple 
comparative method for determining when the scope of a Convention 
right has expanded. Typically, the Court will raise the standard of 
protection in a given domain of law when a sufﬁ cient number of states 
have withdrawn public interest justiﬁ cations for restricting the right. The 
margin of appreciation thus shrinks as consensus on higher standards of 
rights protection emerges within the regime, shifting the balance in favor 
of future applicants. The move will always put some states out of 
compliance. Nonetheless, the Court can claim that there is an external, 
‘objective’ means of determining the weights to be given to the values in 
conﬂ ict, and the Court’s supporters can usually assert that the Court’s 
bias is majoritarian, transnational, and pro-rights. A state that chooses 
not to comply is left to defend a lower standard of rights protection, on 
idiosyncratic or nationalistic grounds. Although states may balk when it 
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comes to implementing controversial judgments, they eventually comply 
in the vast majority of cases. 
 The saga of  Smith and Grady v. UK (1999) 38 illustrates these dynamics. 
The case involved a lesbian air force nurse and a gay naval ofﬁ cer who 
were dismissed pursuant to policy prohibiting homosexuals from serving 
in the armed forces. Each had been highly recommended for promotion 
prior to being ‘outed’ by anonymous sources. Smith and Grady sued, 
pleading Article 8 ECHR (privacy). Although their claims were rejected, 
presiding judges indicated that the plaintiffs would have prevailed but for 
the fact that UK judges were bound by the ‘Wednesbury (Un)Reasonableness’ 
test. A deference doctrine derived from the prohibition of judicial review, 
the test restricts courts from reviewing the merits of a public policy decision 
unless plaintiffs can show that no rational person would have taken it. 
(In its ruling, the Strasbourg Court characterized the test as the rights-
claimant’s burden ‘to show that the policy-maker had ‘taken leave of his 
senses.’). Clearly uncomfortable with the outcome, the Court of Appeal 
urged the claimants to go to Strasbourg. 
 The Court found that the dismissals violated the applicants’ privacy 
rights, and ordered the UK to pay them £59,000 and £78,000 respectively 
(the justice function). The Court also took the opportunity to declare the 
reasonableness test unlawful under the Convention, holding that failure 
of the courts to use PA had violated the applicants’ right to an effective 
judicial remedy (Art. 13 ECHR). In this and subsequent cases, the Court 
required national judges to abandon such deference doctrines. PA is an 
analytic procedure that requires judges to evaluate the merits of public 
policy decisions that infringe upon fundamental rights; judges that adopt 
it are thus fully positioned to render justice in the Kantian sense (the 
monitoring function). Finally, the Court expanded the scope of the right 
to privacy (the oracular function): homosexuals may not be excluded 
from military service. It did so by methodically rejecting each of the 
UK’s arguments in support of its policy. At the same time, the Court 
stressed that those ‘European countries operating a blanket legal ban on 
homosexuals in their armed forces are now in a small minority.’ Although 
protests were heard, the UK lifted the ban in 2000. 39 After adoption, UK 
commissions charged with reviewing the reform found no signiﬁ cant 
negative effects of integrating homosexuals into the armed forces. 
  38   Smith and Grady v. United Kingdom , Applications nos. 33985/96 and 33986/96, ECHR 
Judgment of September 27, 1999. 
  39   The UK had defended the ban as necessary to preserve ‘unit cohesion’ ‘morale’ and 
‘operational effectiveness’ to ensure retention of homophobic soldiers, and to protect gays and 
lesbians from harassment. 
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 Smith and Grady is just one of hundreds of important cases in which the 
Court has explicitly rejected a strategy of rights minimalism. It has steadily 
raised standards of protection with regard to every Convention right, 
thereby requiring ongoing adjustment on the part of laggard states. 40 Its 
approach to qualiﬁ ed rights is infused with cosmopolitan elements. In 
determining the size of a state’s margin of appreciation, the Court makes 
it clear that no state is ever alone in its rights-regarding activities; rather, 
the Court will evaluate justiﬁ cations for limiting a Convention right in the 
light of state practice within the Council of Europe and beyond. It is not 
uncommon for the Court to discuss rulings of the Canadian Supreme 
Court and the South African Constitutional Court, for example. 
 Third, the incentives facing national judges push them toward 
implementing the Court’s progressive rulings, as well as raising standards 
on their own. Simplifying a complex topic, there are several basic logics 
at work. The ﬁ rst is an ‘avoidance of punishment’ rationale: enforcing 
Convention rights will make the state – in practice, the judiciary – less 
vulnerable to censure in Strasbourg. This logic is especially pronounced in 
national systems that otherwise prohibit the judicial review of statute, or 
do not have a national charter of rights. A second dynamic is embedded in 
domestic politics. Individuals and NGOs may seek to leverage the ECHR 
to alter law and policy, and national judges may work to entrench 
Convention rights in order to enhance their own authority with respect to 
legislators and executives. Third, as the CLO gains in effectiveness, the 
interest high courts have in using the Convention, and seeking to inﬂ uence 
the evolution of the ECHR, increases (see Bjørge  2011 ). Even for a court 
that is relatively jealous of its own autonomy, constructive engagement is 
more likely to constrain the Court than the more costly alternatives: 
defection and open conﬂ ict. With regard to domestic arrangements, 
exercising power within the CLO may well be more attractive than 
submitting to the authority of the legislature or constitutional court. 
Friction among national authorities, and between national courts and the 
European Court, has been an important catalyst for the regime’s progressive 
development. 
 Beyond individual justice 
 Protocol No. 11 fully exposes states to the supervisory machinery of the 
ECHR, but the reform did not transfer sovereignty to the Court. The 
  40   In cases in which one right comes into conﬂ ict with a second right, enhancing the protection 
of the ﬁ rst may well involve reducing the scope of the second. In such cases, the Court has steadily 
upgraded the standard of justiﬁ cation that defendant states must meet when they determine how 
two rights are to be balanced. 
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Court’s formal powers remain tailored to its primary mission: rendering 
justice to individual claimants. Nonetheless, the European Court performs 
many of the same functions that powerful national constitutional courts 
do, using similar techniques, with broadly similar effects (Sadurski  2009 ; 
Stone Sweet  2009 ). The Court confronts cases that would be classiﬁ ed, in 
the context of domestic law, as inherently ‘constitutional.’ The Court has 
consistently held that its interpretative precedents bind all judges in the 
system (Besson  2012 ); 41 it resolves alleged conﬂ icts between rights and 
state interests through balancing, using PA; and it routinely indicates how 
a state must reform its law in order to avoid future violations. Further, 
the Court’s most important rulings place national policymakers ‘in the 
shadow’ of future litigation, provoking a politics of adaptation akin to the 
rights-based jurisgenerativity one ﬁ nds in national systems of constitutional 
justice. 42 It would therefore be a serious mistake to read the Convention 
literally to conclude that the Court’s major role is to render individual 
justice. 
 Appendix 2 provides basic data on applications and rulings for each 
member of the ECHR since the entry into force of Protocol No. 11 through 
2010. The huge number of applications to the Court comprises a fairly 
direct measure of the enormous social demand for rights protection under 
the Convention. 43 Pursuant to more than 400,000 petitions, the Court 
rendered some 10,577 ﬁ ndings of violation, and 588 rulings of no violation; 
the Court allowed a further 995 cases to be settled by states with the 
accord of the applicant. Thus, while competition for the Court’s attention 
is ﬁ erce, petitioners prevail in more than 95% of cases ruled admissible. 
Given the ﬂ ood of applications, the Court has little choice but to use 
individual cases to shed light on general problems, and then work to help 
national authorities resolve them. In recent years, structural deﬁ ciencies 
in a handful of states have generated the majority of applications. 44 
  41   As Besson ( 2012 ) reports, many states, including Belgium, Croatia, the EU, Ireland, The 
Netherlands, Spain, the UK, and Ukraine, have also accepted the  erga omnes effects of the 
Court’s precedents. 
  42   Systematic research on the impact of the Court on national law and policy has 
recently taken off, including Andenæs and Bjørge ( 2011 ), Buyse and Hamilton  2011 ; 
Hammert and Emmer  2011 ; Helfer and Voeten (2011), Keller and Stone Sweet ( 2008 ), and 
Von Staden ( 2009 ). 
  43   Petitioning the Court is simple and virtually cost-free: the required forms and easy-to-follow 
instructions are posted online, and applicants do not initially need legal counsel. 
  44   As of the end of 2010, there were 139,630 cases pending before the Court, more than 
two-thirds of which were generated by just six States: Russia (40,295); Turkey (15,206); 
Romania (11,950); Ukraine (10,434); Italy (10,208); and Poland (6,452). Data reported by the 
ECHR in its  Annual Report (Strasbourg, 2010). 
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Where multitudes of ‘clone’ petitions are produced by the same national 
laws or practices, the Court may issue a ‘pilot’ judgment, a ruling that 
‘requires’ a state to change its law so as to avoid chronically reproducing 
the same violation. 45 
 The types of cases the Court confronts vary widely. 46 It monitors states 
that are incapable of maintaining minimal standards of rights protection 
while routinely generating serious violations (right to life, access to justice, 
prohibition of torture). Following World War II (Greece and Turkey), and 
then again after the collapse of the Soviet bloc (including Georgia, Romania, 
Russia, Serbia, and the Ukraine), the Council of Europe chose to admit 
important states that could not be expected, in the near term, to meet the 
criteria normally expected for membership. These decisions placed a huge 
burden on the Court. Today, it regularly confronts cases concerning the 
organization of elections, high-level malfeasance, and military operations 
both at home and abroad, without reliance on a ‘political questions’ 
doctrine, or other deference doctrines that would be anathema to the very 
notion of a CLO. 
 What the data do not show are the myriad ways in which ECHR 
membership bolsters weak domestic systems. Even the worst ‘problem’ 
states, such as Russia and the Ukraine (Nußberger  2008 ), Turkey and 
Greece (Kaboğlu and Koutnatzis  2008 ), and many other post-Communist 
states (Emmert and Hammer 2011), have undergone massive legal 
reforms, major progress that would not have been made without ECHR 
membership and incorporation. The Court is the agent of the CLO 
within national orders. As Buyse and Hamilton ( 2011 : 300) put it: 
‘Through its jurisprudence and its ripple effects, the Court fosters the 
values of democracy, plurality, openness and the rule of law. In doing 
so, it maps the transitional goals to be pursued and helps [post-Communist] 
societies, through the interplay with national institutions and civil society 
actors, [to address] current and future threats to democracy and human 
rights.’ 
  45   As Sadurski ( 2009 ) has demonstrated, the Court’s competence to issue ‘pilot rulings’ 
makes the Court’s ‘constitutional’ functions starkly visible. The European Council expressly 
authorized the pilot ruling procedure in 2004. In February 2011, the Court (which writes 
its own procedures) ‘inserted’ a new Rule 61 to the Rules of the Court. Paragraph 3 of Rule 
61 states: ‘The Court shall in its pilot judgment identify both the nature of the structural or 
systemic problem or other dysfunction as established as well as the type of remedial measures 
which the Contracting State concerned is required to take at the domestic level by virtue of the 
operative provisions of the judgment.’ 
  46   The majority of all cases processed by the ECHR concern the functioning of the judiciary 
(Arts 5 and 6 ECHR). Many States, including Western States like France and Italy, are unable 
to provide ﬁ nal judicial decisions in a reasonable time period, and thus fall afoul of Article 6. 
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 States boasting robust systems of domestic rights protection (e.g., 
Germany, Ireland, and Spain) generate important cases in areas in which 
the protection offered lags behind that of other important systems. The 
perception of a differential in relative standards across jurisdictions 
not only attracts applications; it also animates the Court’s majoritarian 
activism and the dynamic of inter-judicial competition that enables the 
CLO to transcend rights minimalism. Perhaps counter-intuitively, the 
Court’s oracular, law-making function is most prominently exercised 
when it deals with high-standard states. Participation in the CLO helps 
them ‘ﬁ ne-tune’ rights-protection. The CLO ﬁ lls gaps in national 
protection and demands continuous adjustment on the part of all of its 
members. 
 Beyond borders 
 For cosmopolitans, the Court’s capacity to render justice to foreigners 
and to people who are marginalized by, and within, national systems is 
a factor of special importance to the argument that a CLO has emerged 
in Europe. Securing the rights of marginalized groups has become one of 
the central objectives of the ECHR regime (Anagnostou and 
Psychogiopoulou  2010 ). The Council of Europe manages dedicated 
programs designed to ameliorate the plight of Roma and Travelers, for 
example; and the Court has become deeply engaged in supervising 
national treatment of Roma after ﬁ ndings of violation. 47 More generally, 
treatment of foreign nationals, oppressed minorities, and asylum 
seekers are major sources of applications and jurisprudence. While 
no one would claim that the Court, on its own, can eliminate such 
discrimination, the jurisgenerative effects of the CLO on rights politics 
within states deserve to be taken seriously. Lawyers and NGOs 
operating at the national level now routinely leverage the ECHR and the 
Court’s jurisprudence in efforts to change policy and improve the lives 
of individuals and groups, and sometimes these efforts succeed. State 
ofﬁ cials may seek to limit the scope of the Court’s rulings. But they 
remain under the supervision of the Council of Europe and the courts, 
under an expanding cosmopolitan jurisprudence that shines a bright 
light on discriminatory practices. 
 To conclude, I will focus on two strands of cosmopolitan jurisprudence 
that concern citizens of states that are not members of the ECHR. In the 
ﬁ rst, the Court has held that Article 3 ECHR, which prohibits torture 
  47   See the saga of  Moldovan and Others v. Romania (no. 2), Applications nos. 41138/98 
and 64320/01, Judgment July 12, 2005. 
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and inhumane and degrading treatment, barred states from extraditing 
individuals to a non-ECHR country when ‘substantial grounds have been 
shown for believing that the person concerned, if deported, faces a real 
risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3.’ 48 In  Saadi 
(2008), the Court, exercising authority to order interim measures under 
its Rules of Procedure, 49 requested Italy to stay a decision to deport a 
Tunisian national to Tunisia, pending a ruling on the merits. Italy 
complied. The Court ruled that deportation of Mr. Saadi would violate 
Article 3, citing reports by Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, 
and the U.S. State Department to the effect that torture and other forms 
of ill-treatment were routine in Tunisian prisons. The Court pointedly 
rejected arguments made by the UK, as  amicus , suggesting that states did 
not bear the same obligations under the Convention if the ill-treatment 
was ‘inﬂ icted by the authorities of another State” and that ‘this latter form 
of ill-treatment should be weighed against the [security] interests’ of the 
community. Unlike most of the Convention, the Court ruled, Article 3 is 
not qualiﬁ ed by permitted derogations, and thus excludes balancing. The 
Court’s lack of deference contrasts sharply with the refusal of U.S. courts 
to adjudicate cases involving ofﬁ cial torture pursuant to ‘extraordinary 
rendition.’ 50 
 A second strand ﬂ ows from a series of rulings that extended coverage 
of the Convention to state acts that harm people living outside of the 
territory of the Council of Europe (Gondek  2009 ). The most dramatic of 
these require the courts to review the conduct of armed forces acting 
abroad in wartime situations. In 2011, the Court rendered two major 
rulings, virtually unanimously on the important points of law.  Al-Skeini 51 
concerned the deaths of six Iraqi civilians killed by UK patrols during the 
UK’s participation in the Coalition Provisional Authority (which 
governed Iraq in 2003–04). The UK Government had denied requests, 
brought by relatives of ﬁ ve of these victims, for an inquiry and for 
  48   Saadi v. Italy , Application no. 37201/06, ECHR Judgment of February 28, 2008. 
  49   In a July 2011 ‘Practice Direction’ the Court clariﬁ ed its authority under Rule 39 of the 
Rules of Court, stating that it would rely on interim measures ‘only …in exceptional cases 
when, having reviewed all the relevant information, it considers that the applicant faces a real 
risk of serious, irreversible harm if the measure is not applied.’ In such situations, the Court 
attempts to intervene directly within the national legal order in order to stop a violation from 
occurring in the ﬁ rst place. 
  50   Indeed, the Court has declared admissible an application brought by a petitioner whose 
case was dismissed by U.S. courts, despite the direct involvement of U.S. government ofﬁ cials 
( El-Masri v. Moldova , Application no. 39630/09). 
  51   Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom , Application no. 55721/07, ECHR Judgment 
of July 7, 2011. 
A cosmopolitan legal order  81 
consideration of liability and compensation. The UK courts dismissed the 
application for judicial review of the Government’s position on two 
grounds: that the killings fell outside their jurisdiction, and that the 
Convention did not cover the relatives of victims. The European Court, 
echoing prior rulings, held that when a state, ‘as a consequence of military 
occupation … exercises all or some of the public powers normally to be 
exercised by that Government’ then its responsibilities under the 
Convention are engaged. Further, ‘whenever the State through its agents 
exercises control and authority over an individual … the State is under an 
obligation to secure to that individual the rights and freedoms … that are 
relevant to the situation of that individual.’ For its failure to undertake a 
formal investigation of the deaths, the relatives of ﬁ ve victims were 
awarded 40,000 Euros in costs (jointly) and 25,000 Euros each in 
compensation. 
 In  Al-Jedda , 52 the Court censured the UK for having imprisoned the 
petitioner in Iraq for more than three years without bringing charges, 
contrary to Article 5 ECHR. In its defense, the UK claimed that Mr. Al-Jeddah 
had ‘conspired’ to commit acts of terrorism, that his incarceration was 
necessary for ‘imperative reasons of security’ and that it was acting lawfully, 
as an agent of the United Nations under a series of Resolutions of the UN 
Security Council. 53 The House of Lords dismissed the case, holding that 
state obligations under UN Security Council Resolutions overrode those 
of the ECHR. The European Court found for the petitioner and, in a move 
of great potential importance, positioned itself as a check on the Security 
Council:
 In interpreting its resolutions, there must be a presumption that the 
Security Council does not intend to impose any obligation on Member 
States to breach fundamental principles of human rights. In the event of 
any ambiguity … the Court must choose the interpretation which is 
most in harmony with the requirements of the Convention and which 
avoids any conﬂ ict of obligations. In light of the United Nations’ 
important role in promoting and encouraging respect for human 
rights, it is to be expected that clear and explicit language would be used 
were the Security Council to intend States to take particular measures 
which would conﬂ ict with their obligations under international human 
rights law. 
  52   Al-Jedda v. the United Kingdom , Application no. 27021/08, ECHR Judgment of July 7, 
2011. 
  53   UNSC Resolution 1546 (June 8, 2004), for example, confers authority on the multi-national 
force to take measures to prevent terrorism. 
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 Al-Jeddah thus extends the reach of cosmopolitan constitutionalism into a 
realm beyond the ECHR. 
 In a CLO, every public authority, including the UN, bears a duty to 
justify acts that would have the effect of violating the fundamental rights 
of individuals. 54 
 Conclusion 
 I have argued that a legal system that broadly conforms to Kantian 
notions of cosmopolitan Right and justice has emerged in Europe. 
The system was instantiated by Protocol No. 11 to the ECHR and 
the incorporation of the Convention into national legal orders. At the 
regime level, states have steadily strengthened the supervisory capacities 
of the European Court, an organ that, arguably, now functions as a 
transnational ‘constitutional’ court. Within national systems, elected 
ofﬁ cials and judges have gradually abandoned centralized sovereignty 
while institutionalizing complex forms of rights pluralism. In today’s 
CLO, virtually no act of public authority is immune from fundamental 
rights review. While other forms of cosmopolitan order are possible, the 
ECHR has established signiﬁ cant, general criteria for evaluating a CLO 
normatively. The regime has played a major role in helping post-
authoritarian states achieve stable constitutional democracy, thereby 
expanding the ‘zone of liberalism’ in Europe. And the Court has 
progressively developed the content and scope Convention rights, while 
raising the standards of justiﬁ cation that states must meet when they have 
limited enjoyment of a right, including for people who are non-citizens of 
the regime. 
 The CLO imperfectly protects rights . The European Court – overloaded 
and often overwhelmed – is activated, after all, by the inadequacies of 
national protection. It is obvious that judges, other ofﬁ cials, and the Court 
itself 55 routinely fail to meet obligations to fulﬁ ll the fundamental rights of 
all persons that come under their jurisdiction. What is important is that 
they are now positioned to do so. As Kant recognized, the process 
of achieving Right can only be a gradual one. Constructing a cosmopolitan 
commons – those norms, procedures, and dispositions that enable a 
  54   The ruling departs from the approach adopted in the Court’s ruling in  Behrami v. 
France ,  Saramati v. France, Germany & Norway , Application Nos. 71412 & 78166/01, Judgment 
on Admissibility, May 2, 2007. 
  55   Given its enormous caseload, for example, the Court routinely fails to meet the standards 
of Article 6 ECHR (‘everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time 
by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law’). 
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decentralized sovereign to fulﬁ ll the rights of persons – is a necessary ﬁ rst 
stage. Achieving an ever-more effective CLO is likely to be arduous, 
non-linear, and full of setbacks. Further, the evolution of cosmopolitan 
arrangements is not predetermined (Kleingeld  2011 : 67–8). As Brown 
( 2006 : 683) suggests:
 Kantian cosmopolitanism has no particular predictive institutional 
complexion, only the requirement that the process must be the result 
of a free consensus in line with  a priori principles of universal public 
right. … How complex this cooperative system will ultimately become 
will be solely determined by the  wills of various federated states and 
their shared belief in broadening a condition of cosmopolitan public 
right. 
 While I have focused on the European case, the theoretical materials 
developed in the paper have general relevance to global constitutionalism, 
in particular, to cosmopolitan variants. I sought to deﬁ ne a CLO and 
related concepts to make them useful for thinking about how new 
judicial orders might emerge and evolve under conditions of rights-
based, constitutional pluralism. At present, while there are recurrent 
outbreaks of cosmopolitan justice in every region of the globe, only 
Europe provides an example of a CLO. In my view, a stable cosmopolitan 
legal system is only likely to emerge within a zone of liberalism, that is, 
within an interstate territory where the conditions for ‘perpetual peace’ 
have been met. In addition, national legal systems must be (re)conﬁ gured 
so as to permit judges to render cosmopolitan justice. In principle, 
judges and other state ofﬁ cials could forge a cosmopolitan legal system 
on the basis of shared legal norms, practices, and understandings 
(Kumm  2009 ), once mutual trust has been established, and interactions 
among them sustained. The successful construction of a cosmopolitan 
commons, however, is far more likely where there is a treaty, a court, 
and a steady caseload. Imagine, for a moment, the probable trajectory 
of the ECHR without its Court, or without the right of individual 
petition. There would have been little pressure for incorporation. A 
CLO may eventually have appeared, but not as quickly or with as much 
effectiveness. 
 Last, I have not addressed legitimacy concerns, beyond the implicit 
assertion that the CLO is both a product and a source of rights-based 
constitutionalism and jurisgenerativity. If the protection of fundamental 
rights is a core value of pan-European constitutionalism, then the 
CLO is good for Europeans. Of course, the principles associated with 
parliamentary democracy are also core values. The evolution of rights 
pluralism, however, has undermined the models that ofﬁ cials and 
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(continued)
 Appendix 1.  The Incorporation of the ECHR into National Legal Orders 
 State  Mode of Incorporation  Rank  Direct Effect 
 Albania  Constitution  2  Yes 
 Andorra  Constitution  3  Yes 
 Armenia  Constitution  3  Yes 
 Austria  Constitution  2  Yes 
 Azerbaijan  Constitution  3  Yes 
 Belgium  Judicial  1, 2  Yes 
 Bosnia-Herzegovina  Mixed (C/L)  2  Yes 
 Bulgaria  Constitution  3  Yes 
 Croatia  Constitution  3  Yes 
 Cyprus  Legislative  3  Yes 
 Czech Republic  Constitution  3  Yes 
 Denmark  Legislative  3  Yes 
 Estonia  Constitution  3  Yes 
 Finland  Mixed (C/L)  3  Yes 
 France  Mixed (C/J)  3  Yes 
scholars have long used to describe, and normatively circumscribe, how 
state organs, including parliament and the courts, function. Traditional 
notions of sovereignty, separation of powers, the hierarchy of norms, 
the monist/dualist dichotomy, representation, and so on, are no longer 
up to the task. It may be that such notions are in the process of being 
adapted to cosmopolitan precepts and realities. But it also may be that 
the discursive battles between the values of rights cosmopolitanism 
and those of classic statist conceptions of the legal system have barely 
begun. 
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 State  Mode of Incorporation  Rank  Direct Effect 
 Georgia  Constitution  3  Yes 
 Germany  Judicial  *  Yes 
 Greece  Constitution  3  Yes 
 Hungary  Judicial  3  Yes 
 Iceland  Mixed (C/L)  3  Yes 
 Ireland  Legislative  4  Yes 
 Italy  Judicial  3  Yes 
 Latvia  Mixed (C/L)  3  Yes 
 Liechtenstein  Constitution  3  Yes 
 Lithuania  Judicial  3  Yes 
 Luxembourg  Judicial  3  Yes 
 Macedonia  Constitution  2  Yes 
 Malta  Legislative  3  Yes 
 Moldova  Mixed (C/J)  3  Yes 
 Montenegro  Constitution  3  Yes 
 Netherlands  Judicial  1  Yes 
 Norway  Legislative  3  Yes 
 Poland  Judicial  3  Yes 
 Portugal  Judicial  3  Yes 
 Romania  Constitution  3  Yes 
 Russia  Mixed (C/J)  3  Yes 
 Serbia  Constitution  3  Yes 
 Slovakia  Constitution  3  Yes 
 Slovenia  Constitution  2  Yes 
 Spain  Judicial  3  Yes 
 Sweden  Constitution  3  Yes 
 Switzerland  Judicial  3  Yes 
 Turkey  Constitution  3  Yes 
 UK  Legislative  4  Yes 
 Ukraine  Legislative  3  Yes 
 Note: The table does not capture the full complexity of incorporation in any state. 
Incorporation can occur through a speciﬁ c constitutional provision, legislation, and/or judicial 
rulings (typically interpreting the constitutional law as enabling direct applicability of the 
Convention). Key: 
 Rank: Denotes the effective rank, within domestic law, of the ECHR. Key: 1 Supra-
Constitutional; 2 Equivalent to the Constitution; 3 Supra-Legislative (takes primacy over 
statutes in conﬂ ict); 4 Infra-Legislative (judges may not set aside conﬂ icting statutes adopted 
later in time than the ECHR, but are obligated to interpret statutes in light of the Convention, 
and to issue declarations of incompatibility when statutes conﬂ ict with the ECHR or the 
Court’s case law). 
 Direct effect: ‘Yes’ indicates that the ECHR is directly applicable within the national legal 
order, that is, Convention rights (and the Court’s case law) can be pleaded by individuals at 
bar, and judges can enforce them (applying them to resolve the case). 
 *  In Germany, the ECHR is considered to be equivalent to an ‘ordinary statute’ but it is in 
fact treated as an extraordinary statute to render it effective (see text). 
Appendix 1. (Continued)
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 Appendix 2.  The European Court and National Legal Orders under 
Protocol No. 11 (November 1, 1998 – December 31, 2010) 
 State Party  Applications  Admissible  Judgments * 
 Friendly 
Settlements 
 Finding of 
Violation 
 Finding of 
No Violation 
 Albania  476  26  24  1  23  0 
 Andorra  41  3  3  1  2  0 
 Armenia  1420  26  22  0  21  1 
 Austria  3849  212  203  17  169  17 
 Azerbaijan  2523  58  38  0  36  2 
 Belgium  1846  121  110  12  87  11 
 Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
 3606  34  13  0  13  0 
 Bulgaria  8447  429  356  5  332  19 
 Croatia  6447  189  188  26  154  8 
 Cyprus  613  52  51  3  46  2 
 Czech Republic  9353  158  139  8  127  4 
 Denmark  837  32  22  11  5  6 
 Estonia  1665  25  23  1  14  2 
 Finland  2990  143  139  9  111  19 
 France  19048  736  672  51  537  84 
 Georgia  4749  40  39  6  32  1 
 Germany  14924  148  151  9  109  30 
 Greece  4045  570  533  19  503  11 
 Hungary  4382  216  206  6  196  4 
 Iceland  92  9  9  2  7  0 
 Ireland  468  14  14  1  9  4 
 Italy  19207  2431  1875  332  1508  35 
 Latvia  2350  47  45  3  37  5 
 Liechtenstein  63  5  5  0  5  0 
 Lithuania  3222  79  58  6  45  7 
 Luxembourg  303  35  35  3  28  4 
 Macedonia  2658  78  74  3  68  3 
 Malta  124  24  26  0  24  2 
 Moldova  6381  242  170  2  167  1 
 Monaco  44  1  1  0  1  0 
 Montenegro  878  3  3  0  3  0 
 Netherlands  4329  67  74  15  43  16 
 Norway  717  27  23  0  16  7 
 Poland  43106  849  829  40  730  59 
 Portugal  1819  331  183  54  125  4 
 Romania  34875  808  710  23  667  20 
 Russia  84775  1717  1007  13  958  36 
 San Marino  32  8  10  2  8  0 
 Serbia  6922  119  44  0  43  1 
 Slovakia  4857  262  238  20  213  5 
(continued)
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 State Party  Applications  Admissible  Judgments * 
 Friendly 
Settlements 
 Finding of 
Violation 
 Finding of 
No Violation 
 Slovenia  6627  237  233  3  220  10 
 Spain  5901  85  68  1  45  22 
 Sweden  4406  52  51  19  23  9 
 Switzerland  2958  57  62  2  49  11 
 Turkey  35152  3113  2429  203  2174  52 
 Ukraine  30738  982  682  2  676  4 
 United Kingdom  11881  393  324  61  213  50 
 *  The ﬁ gure excludes rulings concerning other issues, such as State objections involving 
further jurisdictional issues and remedies. 
Appendix 2. (Continued)
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